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ABSTRACT
Framework to Secure Cloud-based Medical Image
Storage and Management System Communications
Timothy James Rostrom
School of Technology, BYU
Master of Science
Picture Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS) have been traditionally
constrained to the premises of the healthcare provider. This has limited the availability of these
systems in many parts of the world and mandated major costs in infrastructure for those who
employ them. Public cloud services could be a solution that eases the cost of ownership and
provides greater flexibility for PACS implementations. This could make it possible to bring
medical imaging services to places where it was previously unavailable and reduce the costs
associated with these services for those who utilize them. Moving these systems to public cloud
infrastructure requires that an authentication and encryption policy for communications is
established within the PACS environment to mitigate the risks incurred by using the Internet for
the communication of medical data.
This thesis proposes a framework which can be used to create an authenticated and
encrypted channel to secure the communications with a cloud-based PACS. This framework
uses the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and X.509 certificates to create a secured
channel. An enterprise style PKI is used to provide a trust model to authorize endpoints to
access the system. The validity of this framework was tested by creating a prototype cloudbased PACS with secured communications. Using this framework will provide a system based
on trusted industry standards which will protect the confidentiality and integrity of medical data
in transit when using a cloud-based PACS service.

Keywords: PACS, DICOM, TLS, PKI, medical imaging, cloud computing, secure
communications, mutual authentication
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1.1

INTRODUCTION

Background
Medical imaging systems have been traditionally constrained to the premises of the

healthcare provider. These facilities incur major costs to provide the infrastructure for the
medical image archive systems. Cost of ownership has been a major road block to small scale
healthcare providers and healthcare providers in less developed areas. According to the World
Health Organization, two-thirds of the world’s population has no access to basic diagnostic
imaging services such as x-ray and ultrasound imaging (World Health Organization n.d.).
On the other hand, the increasing volume of diagnostic images in more developed regions
presents a different challenge. It is estimated that in 2014 healthcare providers in the US will
perform over one billion diagnostic imaging procedures and generate approximately 100
Petabytes of data (Prepare for Disaster 2008). At the present rate, the requirements to maintain a
medical image archive system are greater than the rate technology is improving in computing
power, capacity and costs. The amount of digital data being collected is leading to scalability
and management issues for many healthcare providers. In addition to the present and projected
issues, these concerns are a distraction to the management of healthcare providers from their true
focus: providing healthcare services for their patients.
Cloud computing provides an environment where computing and storage services can be
rapidly scaled up or down while costs are incurred on a pay-per-use basis without upfront capital
1

costs. Significant monetary savings can come from utilizing cloud computing for both small and
large organizations (Armbrust, et al. 2009; Rosenthal, et al. 2009). Some other benefits include
more robust and cost-effective business continuity planning such as disaster recovery (Prepare
for Disaster 2008), and allow healthcare providers to focus more on providing healthcare
services rather than managing computing infrastructure (Rosenthal, et al. 2009).

Cloud

computing is a very promising solution to provide for the needs of those who cannot afford
current solutions and those overwhelmed by current and future demands.
These benefits do not come without introducing new risks which primarily come from
using a third party vendor to provide the computing and storage services and moving the
communications from a secure private network to the open Internet. This change introduces a
new requirement to have continuous Internet access to be able to interact with the storage in the
cloud. There is also a new risk that the data could be compromised while in storage on the cloud
server by intruders accessing the cloud service from the Internet, neighboring tenants on the
cloud provider’s system or the employees of the cloud provider (Armbrust, et al. 2009; European
Network and Information Security Agency 2009; Rosenthal, et al. 2009). Legal policies and
jurisdiction concerning cloud computing use are still being explored and debated (Jaeger, Lin
and Grimes 2008).
Moving the communication to the open Internet opens up many risks for communications
such as someone eavesdropping on the communication to steal or modify data, impersonating the
cloud server to steal data or trying to gain access to the cloud server from somewhere outside of
the healthcare provider’s secured network

(Rosenthal, et al. 2009).

Traditionally,

communications are done without any authentication or encryption, which has worked within
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secured private networks, but does not protect the privacy or integrity of the data when
communications are done over the Internet (Kaufman, Harauz and Potter 2009).

1.2

Problem Statement
A practical framework needs to be developed to secure the communications with a public

cloud-based Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS). This was not previously a
major issue in traditional PACS because the communications were constrained to a secure
private network. To utilize public cloud computing, these communications will need to be done
over the open Internet. Lack of an authentication procedure and encrypted communications,
which is common for traditional PACS, is not acceptable in these conditions.

1.3

Thesis Statement
This research proposes a framework to secure the communications within a public cloud-

based PACS environment.

This framework focuses on encrypted communications,

authentication, mobility, scalability, flexibility, utilizing current security and medical imaging
standards and is functional within a cloud environment. This framework is validated by the
implementation of a prototype which will use public cloud services.

1.4

Assumptions
This thesis assumes that a functional framework and prototype can be made to secure

communications within a cloud-based PACS environment. This includes the assumption that
current protocols and standards can provide secure communications both in terms of encryption
and authentication. It also assumes that most public cloud providers will offer similar basic
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functionality that will be used to implement the security mechanisms for the prototype of this
framework.

1.5

Delimitations
The framework and prototype for this project use the best security measures that are

reasonable at the current time and are usable within the constraints of the PACS and cloud
environments. It uses current standards, protocols, encryption and architecture but is not an
evaluation of how secure these are beyond current thought. Along these lines, this research is
not focused on defining cloud computing beyond the need for specific discussions.
The prototype for this project is an evaluation of the proposed framework. To do this,
there is a PACS server deployed to the cloud and a PACS client which will authenticate and
securely communicate using standard protocols.

There is also other infrastructure to facilitate

this architecture. This prototype will be implemented using one public cloud provider and,
therefore, is not an exhaustive study to evaluate the framework for public cloud computing in
general. The prototype and evaluations made should be clear enough that an evaluation of the
framework’s viability for another public cloud provider should be simple.
This study created a framework for securing the communication of a cloud-based PACS.
There are many other security considerations when using public cloud providers including
storage at rest, sustainability and vendor lock-in which will be mentioned in the literature review,
but will not be evaluated in the framework or the prototype. Likewise, this framework is
designed with the needs of healthcare providers and PACS in mind. The principles of the
framework can be used by other systems but was created for this one purpose.

4

2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This research is attempting to take a step in bringing medical imaging systems into a
cloud computing environment by securing the communication between the cloud PACS server
and PACS clients. The medical industry has gone through several iterations of standards for
medical data and communication systems and can be considered fairly well developed. Cloud
computing, on the other hand, is a new industry where standards and protocols are still in early
development. The security industry is also well established but part of its nature is to always be
changing. Merging these three industries and exploring the viability and issues caused by
merging them is the primary aim of this research.
This review has three main focuses.

First, an assessment is made of the current

conditions of medical imaging systems and efforts taken to secure these systems. Second, a
review is made of cloud computing. This review includes benefits and risks of cloud computing
and any work that has been made in the way of moving medical systems to cloud computing
services. Third, several security protocols and measures will be explored which could be used to
secure the communications of a cloud computing service or similar environments.

2.1

Current PACS/ Medical Conditions
Healthcare providers have begun to have major information management issues

concerning the archival of diagnostic images. The rate at which diagnostic images are taken and
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the storage required for those images are on a steep climb. It is estimated that in 2006 there were
600 million diagnostic imaging procedures and that in 2014 there will be over 1 billion (Prepare
for Disaster 2008). The estimates for the storage requirements of primary copies for these
procedures are 24 Petabytes in 2006 and 100 Petabytes in 2014. Even with the advancement of
technology, these rates are making it very difficult for healthcare IT professionals to provide
infrastructure for the increasing needs generated by diagnostic imaging.
Currently, the two primary infrastructures used in the healthcare industry are in-house
computing and grids linked between several institutions (Rosenthal, et al. 2009). Both of these
infrastructures rely on the healthcare provider to fully manage computing infrastructure facilities,
hardware and applications for all of their needs. This allows for great control over the security of
data, usually contained within a secured private network, and control over all information
management personnel and protocols. Even so, all the costs incurred to create and maintain
these systems are primarily a distraction from the primary purpose of providing healthcare to
patients.
The costs and expertise needed to establish and maintain medial image systems are often
too much for small scale and low income healthcare providers. Two-thirds of the world’s
population does not have access to basic diagnostic imaging services such as x-ray and/or
ultrasound (World Health Organization n.d.). These conditions primarily occur in low-income
countries with insufficient infrastructure, an unstable political environment and a considerable
burden of disease. It is assumed that 20-30% of medical cases cannot be properly diagnosed by
clinical considerations alone, leaving these areas with a considerably lower standard of
healthcare. If the expense and need for in-house IT professionals were reduced, medical imaging
systems could be brought to areas that have never had them, improving the quality of care and
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reducing misdiagnosis of illnesses.

This could change the quality of life for significant

populations around the world.
Recently, there have been a few commercial solutions which are trying to alleviate some
of the IT management burden by hosting secondary or off-site backup medical imaging systems.
Many of these services are marketing that these solutions are cloud based systems and can help
solve many of the issues discussed with current healthcare infrastructure. These solutions will be
discussed more in section 2.2.2.

2.2

Cloud Computing
Cloud computing has been a buzz word for the past few years. The National Institute of

Standards and Technology (NIST) define cloud computing as follows:
Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction (Mell and Grance 2009).
For the purposes of this research, cloud computing will be what is commonly referred to as
public cloud computing or utility computing in the form of Software as a Service (SaaS),
Platform as a Service (PaaS) or Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). In general, these are services
as described above, and provide a software suite, platform or infrastructure by commercial thirdparty entities. Although cloud computing is an old concept, it is a new industry. There has been
a lot of talk about how it can and should be used, but policies and standards are still in the
beginning stages.

7

2.2.1

Cloud Computing Benefits and Risks
Cloud computing has received a lot of attention because computing can be done on a pay-

per-use scale with the illusion of infinite computing resources and elimination of up-front costs
(Armbrust, et al. 2009). These, and many other benefits, come from the economy of scale
provided by cloud computing. Cloud computing providers usually have extremely large-scale
commodity-computer datacenters at low cost locations. These conditions can decrease the cost
of electricity, network bandwidth, operations, software, and hardware by a factor of 5 to 7.
These factors make it possible to provide computing as a utility.
Rosenthal et al evaluates how cloud computing could be used for the healthcare industry
(Rosenthal, et al. 2009). Some benefits discussed are scalability, increased resiliency, cost
reductions and reduced management decisions concerning infrastructure. Even within a cloud
environment, security management is still principally the responsibility of the healthcare
organization and is not outsourced to the cloud provider. When moving to the cloud, some
additional considerations for organizations include the jurisdiction the cloud application will be
under, additional risk of hackers and protecting data from the cloud provider and other tenants
using the cloud.
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) have published an
extensive security analysis for cloud computing and provided recommendations to manage and
mitigate cloud specific risks (European Network and Information Security Agency 2009). There
are many benefits to information security within a cloud environment including security on a
large scale, rapid and smart scaling of resources, security as a differentiator and service level
agreements (SLA) forcing better risk management. Some risks inherent to cloud environments
include possible loss of governance, failure to isolate joint tenants on the cloud service and
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possible mishandling of data on the part of the cloud service. As an overall summary the
following statement was given:
The key conclusion of this paper is that the cloud’s economies of scale and flexibility are
both a friend and a foe from a security point of view. The massive concentrations of
resources and data present a more attractive target to attackers, but cloud-based defenses
can be more robust, scalable and cost-effective.
Some of the most complex issues concerning the use of cloud computing are dealing with
information policy and governance (Jaeger, Lin and Grimes 2008). With cloud computing being
such a new industry, legal policies have not been clearly defined yet and it currently being
debated what policies should be in place to govern this utility. Concerning these issues, many
suggest the best available policy is to carefully consider and establish a firm SLA to provide
legal protection of data and services (Kandukuri, Paturi and Rakshit 2009; Rosenthal, et al. 2009;
European Network and Information Security Agency 2009).
There are many advantages that can be gained by healthcare providers who use cloud
computing services including unequaled scalability, reduced costs and reduced burden on
healthcare management among other benefits. These benefits come with new concerns including
increased security concerns and unanswered questions about governance.

With all things

considered, there are many great benefits provided by cloud computing that healthcare providers
are in great need of, and if solutions can be provided to mitigate the concerns and risks
associated with cloud computing, this is a great opportunity for healthcare providers to better
manage their computing needs.

2.2.2

Healthcare and Cloud Computing
Along with all the hype of cloud computing in other industries, cloud services are

beginning to emerge within the medical imaging industry. Part of that is the arrival of some
9

cloud PACS archival providers including Symantec Healthcare (Symantec Healthcare n.d.) and
Care Stream Health (CareStream n.d.). The model for these providers is to create an off-site
PACS archive that is connected to the healthcare provider’s PACS system. The communications
between the healthcare provider and cloud service provider are based on virtual private networks
(VPN) or proprietary communication protocols. These solutions provide a way to have a cost
effective off-site archive but do not reduce the requirement that a healthcare provider has inhouse PACS server infrastructure or allow for mobile PACS clients. Even when these solutions
are utilized, the healthcare provider has no option but to own and maintain server infrastructure
for storage, processing and management of medical images.
There are many other cloud solutions that focus on collaboration and distribution of
medical images. Some of these services include SeeMyRadiology (See My Radiology n.d.), Life
Image (Life Image n.d.), eMix (eMix n.d.), Merge eFilm (Merge n.d.) and MIMcloud (MIM
Software n.d.). The focus of these solutions is to create a collaboration tool where healthcare
providers and patients can store, access and discuss medical images and healthcare concerns.
These solutions do not provide primary PACS infrastructure but are a supplemental system to
improve collaboration or support the in-house PACS.
This research was unable to find a service currently available which moves the primary
PACS system off of the healthcare provider’s network. There are some services which remove
parts of the PACS system but are designed to be a supplement to the healthcare provider’s
systems. Although more cloud products are being offered to relieve the burden of implementing
and maintaining healthcare IT systems, a solution still needs to be made which can move the
primary PACS off the healthcare provider’s shoulders and provide reasonably priced systems for
smaller healthcare providers.
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2.3

Standards and Protocols Concerning Secure PACS Communications
Although the DICOM standard has defined profiles for secure communications for

several years (DICOM 2004), very few PACS implementations have used them. There has not
been a great need to have secure communications within a PACS environment because
communications have traditionally been within a secured private network. Moving the primary
PACS infrastructure to a cloud provider and communicating over the Internet requires the system
to use secured communications and introduces the need for identity management within a PACS
environment.

2.3.1

DICOM Secure Transport Connection Profiles
Part 15 of the DICOM standard defines Secure Transport Connection Profiles (DICOM

2004).

These three profiles are designed to establish a general standard for the secure

communications within a PACS system. These three profiles are the Basic Transport Layer
Security (TLS), Integrated Secure Communication Layer (ISCL) and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) TLS Secure Transport Connection Profiles. ISCL is an obscure protocol which
uses security mechanisms that are now considered highly insecure. The basic TLS and AES TLS
profiles use the TLS standard (Dierks and Rescorla 2008) as a base, but are not constrained to
support all or any specific set of the features defined in the standard. According to these profiles,
the mechanisms for establishing the connection, certificate exchanges and entity authentication
are left up to the application entity. While this standard does define portions of creating a secure
communication it leaves most up to the creators of the PACS system.
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2.3.2

Options for Identity Management
The TLS standard optionally uses X.509 certificates (Housley, et al. 1999) for

authentication and encryption establishment during the initial setup of the connection (Dierks
and Rescorla 2008). To use this mechanism, there should be a policy in place for the creation,
distribution and revocation of these certificates utilizing public key infrastructure (PKI).
Certificate management is not a new concept but there are many forms in which this
management might take shape.

The two common creation methods are to use public

authentication services such as Verisign (VeriSign n.d.) or to have an enterprise certificate
authority structure setup (Thomas, et al. 2008).

Enterprise certificate authorities allow for

greater flexibility for certificate creation, revocation and integration, although this can become a
large burden. Public authentication services remove most of the burden but can slow down the
creation and revocation process and cost large sums of money for each certificate.
There are many other considerations concerning certificate management.

Key use,

cryptoperiod of root and client certificates and revocation of certificates need to be carefully
planned (Barker, Barker, et al. 2007). Policies and infrastructure need to be setup to manage and
enforce these decisions. There are recommendations available for those implementing a PKI
(Barker, Burr, et al. 2009).
How the system grants authorization can also greatly change with different
implementations.

The TLS protocol has a process where the user and the client can be

authenticated through certificate exchanges (Dierks and Rescorla 2008). Using the client and
server certificates issued by the certificate authority can be used to authenticate and create a
secure connection.
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The way these certificates are distributed can vary greatly. The traditional method is to
install the certificate onto the authorized system. This will enable the system and users to use
that certificate to authenticate with a remote party. Another popular certificate distribution
method is through smart cards. These cards contain the encrypted certificate which can be
accessed by putting them in a smart card reader and putting in the user’s credentials. This
method enables users to go to systems with smart card readers and use their personal certificate
to authenticate. With both of these methods, it is recommended that certificates are created to
last for less than 2 years and created for a specific system or user (Barker, Burr, et al. 2009).
Another certificate distribution option would be to use proxy certificates.

Proxy

certificates are a way to better enforce authorization and revocation (Welch, et al. 2004). These
certificates are created by a proxy certificate distributor who takes a username and password or a
certificate, and issues a temporary proxy certificate.

This structure has been used in the

healthcare industry within grid infrastructures to provide better security measures with a shared
environment (Langella, et al. 2008).

This methodology requires that a proxy certificate

distributor would always be available for clients to authenticate and receive their proxy
certificate. This would help protect against stolen certificates and better enforce blocking of
unauthorized access. These proxy certificates could be used just like the other method within the
TLS authentication process.
Identity and access management is another method for authorization and authentication.
The methods commonly used can include having an Identity Provider, user-centric
authentication, single-sign-on or Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) systems, often
with the use of Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) or Web Service Federation (WSFederation) (Brunette and Mogull 2009). These services are primarily based on a user-centric
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username and password and are highly effective for most web-based applications and many other
applications. DICOM does not have the means to simply build in this functionality. It would be
possible to add this functionality but it would be a major addition which would veer far from the
DICOM standard and common implementations.
There are many factors that need to be addressed while creating a framework for secure
communications within a cloud-based medical imaging system. The current protocols provide
many options which have different benefits. Many decisions will have to be made beyond what
standards have outlined and the current work that has been done.

2.4

Risks and Attack Vectors for Cloud-based PACS
There are several risks that will increase when moving from an in-house environment to a

cloud environment. There are also many potential benefits to security by allowing a large scale
cloud provider focused on providing reliable and secure services handle the development and
maintenance of the computing infrastructure (Armbrust, et al. 2009; European Network and
Information Security Agency 2009; Rosenthal, et al. 2009).
Risks concerning the cloud environment compared to in-house infrastructure have been
discussed but there are several risks specific to the communications for a PACS application that
must also be considered when transitioning from an in-house environment to a cloud
environment. Most of these increased risks come because data will be transmitted over the open
Internet and is therefore more vulnerable to external attackers.

It is not that these attacks were

not possible in an in-house environment, but the risk that an attacker can attempt these attacks is
greatly increased by using the Internet for communications.
As discussed earlier, traditional PACS applications do not have a mechanism for
authentication or secure communications, which has worked for an in-house environment but
14

will not protect the confidentiality or integrity of medical data when using the Internet. There
are four main attacks where the risk will significantly increase when moving to a cloud
environment:
1. Unauthorized client access
2. Wiretapping attacks
3. Man-in-the-middle attacks
4. Impersonation of server
In the traditional PACS environment, the PACS clients and servers are protected by
network security measures that attempt to keep unauthorized users completely off of the
network. If a system is on the network, they are typically considered to be authorized. This
assumption is broken when moving the communications to the Internet. An individual endpoint
must be authenticated when they try to communicate with the server. The risk of having
unauthorized clients gain access to the server is to expose the data stored on the server. An
unauthorized user could steal, manipulate or delete the data. This risk primarily comes from an
attacker trying to directly gain access to the system or an attacker stealing the credentials of an
authorized user and using those credentials to gain access to the system.
Using the Internet also exposes data communications to persons who can view the data
being transmitted which is commonly called wiretapping. With this attack, the attacker can view
the medical data in transit and thus is a breach of confidentiality.
A similar attack is the man-in-the-middle attack (MITM) where the attacker acts as a
proxy between the client and the server, seeing and possibly modifying data in transit. The
MITM attack is especially dangerous because it is possible to do even with an encrypted channel
if there is not a proper trust and authentication model established.
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An attacker can also try to impersonate the PACS server and thus be able to receive
medical data or send invalid medical data with the PACS client. The Internet relies on the
Domain Name Service (DNS) to resolve the addressing of system on the network. If this system
were exploited tricking the PACS client to think the attacker’s system was the real PACS server,
this would cause a breach of confidentiality and integrity of the medical data.
These attacks can be mitigated by establishing a secure trust model and encrypting data in
transit. Encrypting the data in transit will mitigate the risk of the wiretapping attack. A secure
trust model will mitigate the risk that unauthorized clients can connect to the system, MITM
attacks can be performed and attacks trying to impersonate the server. How these attacks and
risks are mitigated will be further discussed throughout the work, especially as the framework is
explained in chapter 4.
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3

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this project was to create a framework which will enable authentication
and secure communication within a cloud-base PACS environment. This is a key component to
make it feasible to implement PACS on public cloud services and thus gain the benefits of cloud
computing, including scalability, pricing style, mobility and reducing management concerns.
To reach this goal, the current conditions of healthcare infrastructure and public cloud
computing have been assessed along with other similar systems and how they handle securing
their communications. After this analysis, a framework was established which will accomplish
the goals described in 3.2. A prototype was made to evaluate the validity of the framework
created which is discussed in chapter 5.

3.1

Current State
To be able to create a framework that would secure the communication of a cloud-based

PACS, many assessments of current work and architecture needed to be made. This research
focused on the state of medical image management, public cloud infrastructure and security
infrastructure and protocols. These topics were explored by studying literature, standards and
products that are used today. With this knowledge gained from academia and industry, the
underlying principles were gathered to make a viable framework.
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3.1.1

Medical Image Management
Information about the current conditions of PACS and healthcare infrastructure were

gathered. The healthcare industry has been using digital imaging for about 20 years and has
developed many systems to manage medical images. A clear understanding of what the needs of
the healthcare industry are in relation to medical imaging systems and their communications was
needed to be able to create a framework that will be usable by healthcare providers. In addition,
knowledge of current standards and protocols for medical image systems were needed to see
what is being said about securing the communications within a PACS environment.

3.1.2

Public Cloud Infrastructure
An evaluation was made of current public cloud infrastructure including benefits, security

concerns and functionality. This will justify the benefits and explore the viability of having a
cloud-based PACS.

There are also several differences between traditional in-house

infrastructure and public cloud services which need to be understood to utilize the cloud
properly.

3.1.3

Secure Communications Protocols
An exploration was made of current security protocols. Securing communications is not

a new field and there are many protocols, standards and architectures established and used to do
secure communications. Having an understanding of what is available, and their strengths and
weaknesses provided the knowledge needed to choose the correct security measures to
accomplish the goals of this project.
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3.2

Framework to Secure the Communications of a Cloud-based PACS
The overall goal of this framework is to secure the communications between a PACS

server in the cloud and PACS clients. The framework focuses on utilizing many of the benefits
of cloud computing such as scalability and client mobility and is attempting to lessen or remove
the need for in-house server infrastructure for digital medical imaging management.

This

framework must provide strong security measures for communications which would be
acceptable by the many laws internationally which require healthcare providers to secure the
confidentiality and integrity of medical data including the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) in the United States. The following are the primary goals
of this framework:

3.2.1

•

Secured Channel

•

Authentication

•

Mobility & Accessibility

•

Scalability

•

Flexibility

•

Following Industry Standards

•

Functional with a Cloud Environment

Secured Channel
It is essential that the communications between the client and server are encrypted to

protect the confidentiality and integrity of medical data in transit. The Internet is an open
network and is vulnerable to malicious persons viewing data in transit. By encrypting the
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transmission properly, the data will be unreadable to anyone but the intended recipient. Also, the
use of a strong encryption protocol will assist in maintaining the integrity of the data transmitted.

3.2.2

Authentication
An authentication procedure needs to be placed within the PACS environment to

authenticate both the server to the client and the client to the server to restrict access to data to
authorized endpoints. The DICOM standard does not specify a mechanism for authentication.
Traditionally, PACS implementations do not have an authentication procedure. The nature of
PACS communications and current standards do not provide a viable means for authentication in
the common form of username and password. Another means would be better suited for the
authentication process for these systems.
When deploying a PACS server on the cloud, the server is open and vulnerable to
malicious persons trying to gain unauthorized access to the system because it is accessible over
the Internet. A secure trust model needs to be made which will enforce authorization procedures
and minimize the risk that unauthorized persons can gain the credentials to mimic authorized
personnel.

3.2.3

Mobility & Accessibility
Mobility for the client is one of the greatest benefits of a cloud-based PACS. It makes it

possible that a travelling physician can perform diagnostic imaging or analyze images anywhere
Internet access is available. The traditional constraint of being on the healthcare provider’s
secure network is eliminated. Creating a framework where by physicians can have the freedom
to be anywhere and access the PACS server is a primary goal of this project.
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3.2.4

Scalability
One of the key benefits of cloud computing is scalability. Cloud computing provides for

the needs of a single basic server or an entire server farm depending on the need. The pricing
structure is based on a pay-per-use basis. This makes cloud computing a viable solution for
organizations ranging from small businesses to large enterprises. The framework created to
secure these communications needs to maintain cloud computing’s ability to scale.
The client side of the system also needs to be highly scalable. This framework needs to
provide the means to be used for a small healthcare provider up to a large inner-hospital system.
This could range from a handful of clients to millions of clients.

3.2.5

Flexibility
The need for PACS services vary greatly with healthcare providers.

A healthcare

provider may choose an implementation of this framework to provide their primary or secondary
server infrastructure, increase their mobile imaging capabilities, or use it as an off-site backup.
Furthermore, the organization may want an open system for the entire organization or have a
more complex authorization system where data is restricted to specific groups within the
organization. This framework needs to be flexible enough to work for the various needs and
desires of the organization.

3.2.6

Follow Industry Standards
There are many standards for medical image systems and secure communications

currently used in industry. The goal of this project is not to create novel protocols for either, but
to use what is currently considered the best practices in each industry and apply it to this unique
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environment to accomplish the goals stated in this section. Using the current standards will also
simplify implementation strategies and increase portability of the framework.

3.2.7

Function within a Cloud Environment
Public cloud infrastructure is similar to traditional in-house infrastructure in many ways

but can vary greatly in some aspects. Because the nature of cloud computing is to create a highly
scalable environment where resources can be dynamically allocated or removed, functionality
such as storage and configurations follow a different paradigm. Cloud infrastructure providers
have implemented cloud specific functionality in various ways but there are some general
concepts which can be followed. These concepts were considered in building this framework so
that it will function properly within most cloud environments.

3.3

Prototype of Framework
To assess the viability of the framework, a prototype was created.

This prototype

implements the functionality outlined in the framework and provided a testing ground to refine
the details of the framework. Through this prototype, the goals of the framework were assessed
and validated. For this prototype, a public cloud infrastructure provider, cloud-based PACS
server and PACS client were chosen.
For a public cloud infrastructure provider, this prototype will use Windows Azure
(Windows Azure n.d.).

Windows Azure is one of the leading public cloud infrastructure

providers and its infrastructure supports the fundamental goals of this project. It will also allow
for the type of customization which is required for this implementation. Windows Azure has
been a great option for the prototype but most any public cloud infrastructure provider should
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work to implement this framework such as Amazon’s EC2 (Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud
n.d.) or Rackspace (Rackspace n.d.).
For a cloud-based PACS server, the Medical Imaging in the Cloud (MIMIC) project
(Teng, Mitchell, et al. 2010) will be used. This project has been developed as a functional PACS
server designed for the Windows Azure cloud platform. This project conforms to the DICOM
standard and also supports the goals of mobility, scalability and flexibility. There was no
security for communications implemented in this project but the creators state that having this
functionality is one of its future goals.
The client for this prototype was the Mobile Ultrasound Connectivity Kit (MUCK)
project (Teng, Green, et al. 2011). This project was created to provide an application that can
retrieve images from a portable USB ultrasound device and send these images to a PACS server.
The primary goal of this project is to provide mobility for ultrasound imaging. This provided an
ideal client to verify the mobility of the framework created.
Once the prototype was developed and functional, the goals of the framework were
assessed and verified.

This prototype provided mobile imaging services which use cloud

computing services as the primary PACS infrastructure. The framework was able to provide a
means to implement a cloud-based PACS environment which could authorize, authenticate and
secure the communications between the cloud server and mobile clients over the Internet.
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4

4.1

FRAMEWORK

Overview
The goal of this framework is to secure the communications between a PACS server in

the cloud and PACS clients. The framework focuses on utilizing many of the benefits of cloud
computing such as scalability and client mobility, and is attempting to lessen or remove the need
for on-premise server infrastructure for digital medical image management. The seven criteria
explained in section 3.2 are the key requirements of this framework.

4.1.1

Framework Overview
To create secure communications within a cloud-based PACS, there needs to be a method

for encrypting the communications channel and authenticating the client and server.

The

framework is generally explained in two parts: means for authorization and means to create a
secure channel.

24

Figure 4-1: General Goal of Framework

An enterprise style Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used as a means to authorize the
cloud server and clients. The cloud service provider or healthcare provider will have their own
root and issuing Certificate Authorities (CA). Credentials will be distributed from the issuing
CA, in the form of signed X.509 certificates, to the cloud server and all clients.

These

distributed X.509 certificates provide the means to prove authorization for the endpoints.
This framework uses the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to secure
communications.

When a TLS connection is being established, the client and server are

authenticated by each exchanging their signed X.509 certificate. An endpoint will be considered
authorized if a valid certificate signed by the mutually trusted root CA is presented. Once both
parties trust each other, the communication continues by using an encrypted connection. In this
way, TLS will mutually authenticate both endpoints and create a secure channel to transmit data.
Using PKI for authorization and TLS to authenticate the endpoints and provide an
encrypted channel provides a flexible and standardized method for establishing secure
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communications. This model provides control for the healthcare provider or cloud service
provider to manage all endpoints and allow for mobility and scalability. The details of the PKI
for this framework are explained in section 4.2. This is followed by the details of the TLS
implementation for this framework in section 4.3.

4.1.2

Scenarios

Table 4-1: Scenarios using Framework

Scenario
Private cloud service
Public cloud service
Dedicated public cloud service
Multi-tenant cloud service

Description
Developed and maintained by healthcare provider
Third party provides cloud service to healthcare provider
Dedicated public cloud service for each healthcare provider
Shared public cloud service for several healthcare providers

4.1.2.1 Private Cloud Service
There are a few foreseeable scenarios where this framework can be used. The first
scenario is a healthcare provider who uses this framework for their own medical image
management. This will be termed the private cloud service scenario. In this scenario, the
healthcare provider has their own technical staff to implement and maintain the system. Part of
the design and implementation will be to choose an infrastructure as a service (IaaS) provider,
PACS software for both the cloud server and clients, and several details of how to implement the
framework. This scenario is probable for a large healthcare provider who already has the
technical staff, wants great flexibility and has the funds to implement such a system.
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4.1.2.2 Public Cloud Service
The second scenario is a company which would develop a cloud-based medical image
management system and offer it as a service to healthcare providers. This will be termed the
public cloud service scenario. In this scenario the public cloud service company will choose an
IaaS provider or develop their own cloud infrastructure to place the medical image management
system. The public cloud service company will offer to the healthcare provider a cloud-based
PACS and protocol to manage authorization and authentication. They would also provide client
software in the form of a full PACS client or an add-on to an existing PACS client to manage the
communications to the cloud service.
A public cloud service can have a dedicated cloud portal for each healthcare provider or
have a single cloud portal for several healthcare providers. The former option will be termed the
dedicated public cloud service and latter option will be termed the multi-tenant cloud service
scenario. The multi-tenant scenario will need to develop a mechanism to restrict access to data
based on the authentication parameters. In both cases, there are several decisions that the public
cloud service provider will need to consider to create a secure cloud system.
The nature of implementing a public cloud service has many unique challenges compared
to a private cloud service. As the framework is explained, these scenarios will be referenced to
describe how the framework could be used in these cases. For the most part, there will be no
differences but some features will need to be treated differently depending on the scenario.

4.2

Public Key Infrastructure
PKI was chosen for this framework because it is a popular and standardized authorization

mechanism which is highly scalable and flexible. The architecture and policies governing a PKI
and its certificates can be tailored to the size and needs of the organization. There are also many
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products available which can be used to implement the PKI. A properly developed PKI can
provide the means to securely authorize and authenticate a cloud server and clients within a
PACS environment.
This framework will define how a PKI can be established for use with a cloud-based
PACS but assumes that the reader of this framework will use general best practices for setting up
a PKI. Some best practices and suggestions will be mentioned, but the framework is not
intended to be a specification for PKI best practices.

For more details see NIST’s

recommendations for PKI and TLS (Barker, Burr, et al. 2009). The background of how a PKI
can provide secure authorization and authentication is discussed in section 4.2.1.

This is

followed by the specification of how PKI is used to implement this framework in sections 4.2.2
through 4.2.6.

4.2.1

PKI Security Services
There are four technologies which need to be understood to comprehend how PKI can be

used to provide an authorization mechanism in this framework: public key encryption, digital
signatures, certificate chains and certificate validation.

All of these technologies are used

together to create a trust model through PKI which can be used to authorize and authenticate an
endpoint when working over an open network connection such as the Internet.
Public key cryptography is based on having public/private key pairs and the one way
encryption property of the key pair. The public key is freely distributed, in this case within
X.509 certificates. The owner of the key pair must be the only entity to have the private key. If
the private key is lost or stolen, the key pair is considered compromised and can no longer be
trusted. These keys work together where data encrypted with one key can only be decrypted by
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the other. In this way, key pairs can be used to provide confidentiality, integrity and/or nonrepudiation.

4.2.1.1 Public Key Encryption
Public key encryption is used to make data unreadable by anyone except the intended
recipient. One of the great advantages to this system is that, if used properly, the public key can
be freely given to anyone and messages encrypted with that key can only be decrypted by the
owner or entity with the private key. A major disadvantage is that it is slow compared to
symmetric encryption algorithms where a shared key is used. Often public key cryptography is
used to negotiate a symmetric key which will be used for an encrypted channel such TLS as used
by this framework. (See details about TLS handshake in section 4.3.1.) Take the example of
Alice sending a confidential message, which could be a symmetric key, to Bob. Alice wants to
send this data to Bob and ensure that only Bob can read the message. She would follow these
steps:
1. Beforehand, Alice would get Bob’s public key.
2. Alice would encrypt the message using Bob’s public key.
3. Alice would send the encrypted message to Bob.
4. Bob would decrypt the encrypted message using Bob’s private key and receive the
original message.
This procedure ensures that the message encrypted by Alice can only be read by Bob,
assuming that Bob is the only person who has possession of Bob’s private key. Public key
encryption is used to secure the confidentiality of the message.
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4.2.1.2 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures are used to provide integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation of a
message. If Alice wanted to prove to Bob that a message was sent by her and was not tampered
with she would send a digital signature with the message by following these steps:
1. Alice makes a digest of the message using a hash function. This is a way to make a
repeatable fixed sized value which is probabilistically unique to the message.
2. Alice encrypts the digest with her private key, producing the digital signature.
3. Alice sends the message and digital signature to Bob.
4. Bob decrypts the digital signature with Alice’s public key to get the digest.
5. Bob makes his own digest of the message using the same hash function.
6. Bob compares the results of the decrypted digital signature and the digest he created.
If they are the same, he knows the message has not been tampered with and came
from Alice.

4.2.1.3 Certificate Chains
Certificate chains rely on the properties of integrity and non-repudiation provided by
digital signatures. A certificate is a file which can be used for identification and contains many
attributes including subject, issuer, public key and key usage. A certificate is authorized by
having it signed by a certificate authority (CA). A key pair is created and certificate signed by
the following steps between an endpoint and a CA:
1. Endpoint creates a new private/public key pair.
2. Endpoint creates a certificate request including the public key. Note the private key
will never leave the endpoint.
3. Endpoint sends certificate signing request to CA.
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4. CA issues and signs certificate using its private key.
5. CA sends signed certificate to endpoint.
6. Endpoint installs the signed certificate and can now use it as a means to prove their
identity and their given authorization from the CA.
A signed certificate can be seen as a link in a chain, connected to the CA’s certificate by
the issuer attribute and the digital signature. Usually in a PKI, a certificate has a chain of several
certificates which ultimately links it back to a mutually trusted root CA as shown in Figure 4-2.

Figure 4-2: Certificate Chain

4.2.1.4 Certificate Validation
Certificates are created to provide a means for identification, authorization and
distribution of public keys but they cannot be trusted until they have been validated through a
series of checks. Once a certificate has been validated, the entity can trust the identification
provided by the certificate and use the public key as a means to encrypt secret messages to send
to the owner of the certificate. When a certificate is presented to an entity a certificate can be
validated by performing the following checks:
1. Verify the issuing and expiration dates are inclusive of the current date. This is
discussed further in section 4.2.6.
2. Validate the certificate chain. This is done by verifying the digital signatures of the
certificates in the chain and that a mutually trusted root CA is at the end of the chain.
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3. Check if the certificate has been revoked. This is further discussed in section 4.2.6.
4. Verify that the usage constraints include the current use.
5. Verify that the entity owns the private key associated with the certificate. This is
commonly done with a challenge. The challenge used for this framework is discussed
in section 4.3.1.
The security services explained here is the foundation for how PKI can provide the means
to create a secure trust model within a system. Setting up a PKI consists of establishing an
infrastructure that has CAs which can issue signed certificates to endpoints. This begins by
establishing a root CA with a self-signed certificate and distributing that certificate to all entities
within the system. This certificate is what is checked when the certificate chain is validated.
There should be at least one more CA established which will issue certificates to the endpoints.
More details about the architecture of the PKI for this framework are explained in 4.2.2. The
root CA should not be used to issue certificates to endpoint because this requires that it remains
online, and is therefore more vulnerable to have its private key compromised. The root CA is the
ultimate authority in the PKI structure and compromising this key would destroy the trust model
for the entire system. If an issuing CA’s private key is compromised, it is still a problem, but can
be fixed while still keeping the root CA as the ultimate trusted authority. An issuing CA is
established by creating a new key pair and having the root CA sign a certificate for the issuing
CA. Multiple issuing CAs can be created to make a more organized and robust infrastructure.
At this point, the CA infrastructure is established and can issue signed certificates for endpoints.
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Figure 4-3: Setup of a PKI

4.2.2

Architecture
The PKI for this system requires there to be at least a root CA and issuing CA(s)

established as described in section 4.2.1.4. If the PKI needs to be more flexible, then policy
CA(s) may be useful to place between the root CA and issuing CAs. In this case, the root CA
creates and signs a certificate for a policy CA. The policy CA creates and signs a certificate for
the issuing CA. The issuing CA will create and sign certificates for the server and clients.
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Figure 4-4: Layout Structure of PKI

How a specific implementation is designed depends on the scale and flexibility needed by
the system. A small PKI with only a root CA and an issuing CA could be used for a small
system which does not see major growth in the near future. As the system gets larger, more
issuing CAs should be added to make the PKI more manageable and possibly separate groups
within the system. If this is intended for a multi-tenant PKI, a policy CA can be created for each
healthcare provider and used as the identifier to restrict access to that organization’s data. When
policy CAs are used, the amount of issuing CAs for a policy CA would depend on the size and
needs of the organization the policy CA serves. A large PKI can provide many benefits to large
systems in the form of better certificate management with large numbers of certificates,
flexibility with creation and distribution, more refined authorization and authentication, and
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management of multi-tenant systems. These are decisions that will have to be made by the
implementers depending on the specific situation at hand.

4.2.3

Authorization
General authorization in this framework is defined as being able to present a valid

certificate as defined in section 4.2.1.4. The process for authorization and authentication are
shown in Figure 4-3.

Signed certificates are distributed to CAs and endpoints to provide

authorization. When these endpoints attempt to authenticate they will exchange the certificate
chain, including their signed certificate and the certificates of the CAs back to the mutually
trusted root CA. This basic process will work well if the cloud service is intended for a single
healthcare provider and the PKI is only used for that healthcare provider.
For a multi-tenant cloud service or a shared PKI there needs to be a mechanism which
will differentiate a client in one organization from another. If there has been a policy or issuing
CA created for a specific organization, this CA also needs to be checked for in the certificate
chain to authorize the endpoint for that specific organization’s data. An alternative to having
dedicated CAs for each healthcare provider or organization would be to set an attribute within
the certificate to designate the client’s authorization to a specific data set. For either method, the
cloud server will need a mechanism to restrict access to each organization’s data depending on
their authorization.

4.2.4

Certificate Creation
Certificates need to be created for each cloud server and client. For the case of the cloud

server, there needs to be one certificate made for the cloud deployment. For the case of the
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clients, a certificate is created either for each PACS hardware client or for each authorized user
which will be further discussed in section 4.2.5.
When a certificate is created there are several parameters which need to be set which
include the subject, key length, expiration and key usage. Subject can be used by the cloud
server to log who has accessed the system. Expirations will be discussed in section 4.2.6.
Appendix B goes into more detail about how keys can be setup.

Many of the details of

certificate creation will be decided by the manager of the PKI following the current general
practice guidelines.

4.2.5

Certificate Distribution and Usage
Each certificate created by an issuing CA needs to be distributed in a way that is secure

and usable by that entity. For the cloud server, it is installed onto the cloud service according to
the mechanism supplied by the IaaS provider.
For client certificates, there are many ways distribution and usage can be handled
depending on the needs of the organization. The first step is to decide if certificates are issued to
each PACS client, each authorized user or some mix of the two options. To decide which is best
for the situation, a security analysis needs to be conducted to examine the physical security of the
hardware, security mechanisms implemented on the hardware, operating system and PACS
client, available authorization systems, needs of the users and a risk analysis. The recent study
by Liu et al can help explain and explore many factors associated to the security risks and needs
for healthcare information systems (Liu, et al. 2010).
There are various mechanisms which can be used to handle certificates and their private
keys depending on the need. For certificates issued to PACS clients, the recommended method
would be to use the operating system’s certificate management system. If this method is chosen,
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care needs to be placed into enabling security features which control access to the machine’s
functionality and data to protect the private key from unauthorized use or theft which could
include password protection for the system, password protection for the private key, control
physical access, encrypt the hard drive and control user privileges.
Issuing certificates to authorized users is another method that can be used and can be
done in many forms. The most popular and portable form would be a smart card which holds the
certificate and private key within the card itself. To use it, the user puts the smart card into a
smart card reader, enters security credentials and the certificate and private key are available for
use. Another method could be to install the certificate and private key on a machine and protect
that computer and private key with personal credentials.
An alternative to these methods for certificates issued to users is the use of proxy
certificates with a proxy certificate server. This method could be the best option but is less
common and would significantly change the structure of the PKI and will not be further
discussed here. More information can be found about proxy certificates in the specification
(Welch, et al. 2004) and related studies such as the one by Langella et al (Langella, et al. 2008).
The method chosen depends greatly on the needs of the system. It is possible that some
systems will have installed certificates for the PACS client and others will use user specific
certificates via smart cards. For any of these methods, the primary concern needs to be the
security of the private keys, so that no unauthorized person can gain access to use or steal
authorized private keys and certificates.

4.2.6

Certificate Management
After certificates are issued and distributed there needs to be mechanisms in place to

manage those certificates. There are two primary methods to manage certificates built into
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standard PKI systems: certificate expirations and certificate revocation lists (CRL). Expirations
provide a means to limit the risk of compromised private keys by theft or brute force attacks.
Even if a key is compromised, it can only be used before the designated expiration. Expiration
dates need to be soon enough to mitigate risk but long enough to be usable and not incur too
much over-head costs. Currently, the recommended period for a certificate is less than 2 years.
Certificate revocation lists are another way to mitigate risk and manage certificates. The
CRL is controlled by the CAs and can be issued at regular intervals or directly checked as part of
the certificate validation process. These lists can invalidate certificates which are compromised
or are otherwise deemed invalid, such as certificates belonging to former employees or
decommissioned equipment.
Establishing efficient management of certificates is going to be a crucial component to
keep a secure and usable authorization and authentication system in this environment. Most CA
software suites have options to help automate and lessen the work load needed to keep up a PKI.
Even so, there are many details which need to be decided by the implementers of such a system.
For more details and recommendations concerning general PKI, see NIST’s Recommendation
for Key Management Part 3 (Barker, Burr, et al. 2009).

4.3

Securing Communication Channels
With a PKI in place, the certificates distributed to the cloud server and clients can be used

as a means for authentication when a connection is being established. As mentioned before,
there is no standard system for authentication within a PACS environment. There also needs to
be a means to encrypt the communications to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
medical data. DICOM, the standard for communications with PACS, defines TLS as an optional
Secure Transport Connection Profile to protect confidentiality and can be used as an
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authentication mechanism. TLS has also become the industry standard for encrypting network
communications. TLS is a standard which provides many options for use to fit the specific need.
In the case of this framework, TLS will be used with a mutually authenticated channel using
X.509 certificates and an encrypted channel using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
Details of how the TLS protocol functions in this framework will be explained in section 4.3.1.
Overview discussions of how TLS interacts with the DICOM protocol and provides the means to
secure medical data in transit are provided in sections 4.3.2 through 4.3.4.

4.3.1

TLS Handshake
The TLS handshake provides a means to mutually authenticate the endpoints and

establish an encrypted channel. The TLS handshake and its security properties as used by this
framework will be discussed here to provide a background about how the proper use of this
protocol with the PKI previously established can mitigate the risks discussed in section 2.4. It
should be noted that the TLS protocol as used by this framework does not vary from the standard
and can be implemented by using standard security libraries in most programming languages.
The TLS handshake for this framework will exchange and verify signed certificates to provide a
means of authentication and securely establish symmetric keys that will be used for the
encrypted channel for further communications.

The TLS standard can provide more details

about the handshake and options that can be used (Dierks and Rescorla 2008).
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Figure 4-5: TLS Handshake
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1. ClientHello:

The TLS handshake begins with the client sending a ClientHello

message to the server specifying the highest TLS version, suggested cipher suites and
a random number.
2. ServerHello: The server responds with the chosen TLS version, chosen cipher suite
and a random number.
3. Certificate: The server sends its signed certificate to the client. The certificate will
be validated by the client according to the conditions explained in section 4.2.1.4.
The challenge to prove the server has the associated private key is done by verifying
the server can decrypt the ClientKeyExchange message and produce a correct
Finished message. This validation, along with the establishment of the PKI, will
protect against attackers trying to impersonate the server.
4. CertificateRequest: The server requests for the client’s certificate.
5. ServerHelloDone: There server indicates it is done with this phase of the handshake.
6. Certificate: The client sends its certificate to the server. The certificate will be
validated by the server according to the conditions explained in section 4.2.1.4. The
challenge to prove the client has possession of the associated private key is done
through the CertificateVerify message. This validation, along with the establishment
of the PKI, will protect against unauthorized users gaining access to the server.
7. ClientKeyExchange: The client chooses a random bit stream to send to the server
that will be used as the premaster secret to build the symmetric keys needed for the
encrypted channel. The client encrypts this bit stream with the server’s public key as
a challenge to the server to prove they have the private key associated with the signed
certificate it presented.

This also protects against anyone listening to the
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communications so they cannot get the bit stream and also produce the symmetric
keys that will be used for encryption later on.
8. CertificateVerify: This message is sent to prove to the server that the client has
possession of the private key associated with the certificate sent. The message is a
digital signature of the running hash of all messages sent or received thus far for the
TLS handshake. This not only proves to the server that the client has possession of
the private key associated with the certificate presented, but that the messages sent
have not be modified by an attacker in transit. A description of how digital signatures
function is explained in section 4.2.1.4.
9. ChangeCipherSpec: This optional message allows the client to request a change to
the TLS version or cipher suite.
10. Finished: This message indicates the end of the client’s communication for this phase
and is the first message sent using the symmetric keys that will be used for the
encrypted channel. The symmetric keys are created by passing the two random
numbers exchanged in the hello messages and the premaster secret which the client
declared in the ClientKeyExchange into an algorithm which will create keys specific
for the cipher suite chosen.

The message encrypted is the running hash of all

messages sent or received thus far during the TLS handshake. In this way, this
message is a final validation to the server that a man-in-the-middle attack is not being
performed and that the client has produced the same symmetric keys that that server
has produced.
11. ChangeCipherSpec: This optional message allows the server to change the TLS
version or cipher suite.
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12. Finished: This message indicates the end of the TLS handshake and verifies that both
parties are ready to exchange data using the symmetric keys.

Like the client’s

Finished message, it is a running hash of all messages sent or received thus far
encrypted with the new symmetric keys. This provides a final assurance to the client
that a man-in-the-middle attack is not being performed and that the server has
successfully created the symmetric keys needed to continue communications using
the encrypted channel.
Note that the version of TLS required by this framework is not specified. The description
for the TLS handshake provided here is the same for all current versions of TLS. It is suggested
to use the newest version of TLS available that is considered secure. At the current time, TLS
versions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 have been specified but many implementations in security libraries for
common languages only have TLS version 1.0. Although TLS version 1.0 is not the newest
version, it is still generally considered secure for the type of use specified by this framework.

4.3.2

DICOM over TLS
TLS provides a means for authentication and encryption as a layer which DICOM can be

communicated over which does not affect or modify the DICOM messages. This is possible
because TLS operates on the Transport Layer of the Open System Interconnection model (OSI).
Application data, including the communication using the DICOM protocol, run on top of the
Transport Layer and therefore are unaffected when using an encrypted channel provided by the
TLS protocol. In this way, DICOM communications can continue as they traditionally have,
with the only change being to establish a TLS connection before communicating using the
DICOM protocol.
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4.3.3

Authentication
For this framework, the TLS handshake will authenticate both the server to the client and

the client to the server using X.509 certificates. Entities will be considered authenticated if they
meet the criteria explained in 4.2.1.4. If the PKI was established to differentiate data access by
the Policy or Issuing CAs such as is suggested in the case of a multi-tenant system, a check will
also need to be made for that CA’s certificate in the certificate chain. After these checks are
performed, a system log can be created to record the endpoint accessing the server. With the
authentication done through certificates, the client is assured they are communicating with the
valid cloud server and the server validates the client is authorized to access the server data.

4.3.4

Encryption
Once authentication has taken place, TLS will then provide an encrypted channel for the

rest of the communication session. The current standard for TLS is to use AES with a 128 bit
encryption key and the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) for integrity. This encryption will
provide the confidentiality and integrity required of healthcare providers for data
communications.

Figure 4-6: Simplified TLS Authentication and Encryption Process
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5

PROTOTYPE

The framework has been validated by creating a prototype that uses the guidelines and
principles contained in this framework.

This prototype includes a functioning PKI, an

operational cloud PACS server and mobile PACS client which establish the means needed to
authenticate and communicate DICOM over an encrypted TLS channel. An overview of how
these systems were implemented will be explained.

More details concerning specific

implementation issues can be found in the Appendices.

5.1

Public Key Infrastructure
For this prototype a root CA and issuing CA were created with Microsoft Server 2008 R2

and Active Directory Certificate Services.

To establish a functioning PKI that can issue

certificates to the cloud server and client, the following steps were performed.
1. The root CA created a self-signed certificate for itself with a key length of 2048 bits
and expiration in 20 years.
2. The issuing CA installed the public certificate of the root CA and made a request for
the root CA to sign a certificate with a key length of 2048 bits and expiration in 10
years.
3. The root CA signed the certificate and distributed it to the issuing CA with the key
usage rights to sign certificates and sign CRL.
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4. The root and issuing CAs are then setup to revoke certificates by enabling the CRL
service to issue new lists on a specified interval. The issuing CA was also enabled
with the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) which allows clients to
interactively request the status of certificates.
5. At this point the root CA is taken off-line for security, only coming on-line
periodically to issue a CRL.
The cloud server and each client then need to have a new key pair and signed certificate
signed by the issuing CA to provide authorization and means for authentication. The process to
create these key pairs and get signed certificates for the cloud server and clients are slightly
different. Windows 7 machines were used for the clients using the built-in certificate manager to
create requests to sign certificates, install certificates and store the key pair and signed certificate.
Getting a new key pair and signed certificate for the clients were achieved by the following
steps:
1. On the client machine, a new key pair and request for a signed certificate was created.
2. The request for a signed certificate was sent to the issuing CA.
3. The issuing CA signed, issued and distributed the certificate back to the client. For
this prototype, the requests and signed certificates are delivered over the network.
Because the private key is created by the client and never left the client, using an
insecure means for sending the certificate request and signed certificate is perfectly
fine.
4. The client installed their new signed certificate, the issuing CA’s certificate and the
root CA’s certificate. The client needs all of these certificates to send a certificate
chain to authenticate to the server.
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Creating a certificate for the cloud server is a very similar process. Windows Azure was
used for the IaaS for this prototype. There is not a standard means for Windows Azure to
directly create a request for a certificate. To create a key pair and get a signed certificate for the
cloud server, the following steps were followed.
1. A trusted and secured client was used, to make a request for the cloud server’s
certificate and have it signed as if it were its own certificate following the steps just
explained.
2. Once that trusted machine had possession of the signed certificate, the certificate and
private key were exported and installed on the Windows Azure certificate manager
through the secured web management interface along with the certificates of the
issuing CA and root CA.
3. The private key and signed certificate of the cloud server were backed-up onto a
secure off-line location and removed them from the trusted machine.
With this structure in place, there is a model of trust established through this PKI which
can authorize and authenticate both the cloud server and the clients within the system. The cloud
server and clients have the certificates needed to authenticate with each other. Note that the
cloud server and clients have the mutually trusted root CA’s certificate so that they can
authenticate remote certificates trying to authenticate with them. The CAs have been established
so that new certificates can be issued and invalid certificates can be revoked.

5.2

Cloud Service
The cloud service was created to be a fully functional PACS server and was based on the

Medical Imaging in the Cloud (MIMIC) project (Teng, 2010) which was created to be deployed
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on Windows Azure cloud services. The project was built in the .NET framework without
authentication or secured communications built into the system.
To produce a system where communications are secured, mechanisms were placed to
establish an authenticated and encrypted TLS channel during the initiation of the
communications. After the TLS channel was created, the server and client communicated using
the traditional DICOM protocol over the encrypted channel.
To create this authenticated and secured TLS channel on the cloud server side the
standard .NET functionality for TLS was used which provided fine grained but high-level control
over the TLS handshake process. Details about the TLS handshake are explained in section
4.3.1. Specific code to implement the cloud server code in .NET is found in Appendix C. As a
summary, the cloud server used the following process to establish a TLS connection with the
client:
1. When a request for communication comes from the client, the cloud server responds
with its signed certificate and the associated certificate chain which are stored in the
Windows Azure certificate manager. Along with that response, it requests for the
client’s certificate.
2. The client responds with its signed certificate and associated certificate chain.
3. The cloud server validates the client’s signed certificate and associated certificate
chain using the procedures explained in 4.2.1.4. If the server cannot authenticate the
client, it drops the connection.
4. During these correspondences, the server and client have exchanged information to
create an encrypted AES channel. Once the server has authenticated the client it
begins communicating with the encrypted AES session.
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5.3

Mobile Client
The prototype used the Mobile Ultrasound Connectivity Kit (MUCK) project (Teng,

Green, et al. 2012) to validate the usefulness of this framework when using mobile PACS clients
which would connect to the cloud service over the Internet. MUCK was created using the .NET
framework to provide a mobile PACS client which could take medical images from a mobile
device and send them to a PACS server but was built without authentication or secured
communications mechanisms.
Enabling secure communications for this project was very similar to enabling it for the
MIMIC server because they were both built on the .NET framework. During the initialization
stage of communications an authenticated and encrypted TLS channel was created. Details
about the TLS handshake are explained in section 4.3.1. For details about the .NET code used to
implement the TLS handshake see Appendix C. As a summary, the following process is how the
client authenticates the cloud server and creates a secure channel:
1. The client requests for communications from the server.
2. The server responds with its signed certificate and associated certificate chain.
3. The client validates the cloud server’s signed certificate and associated certificate
chain using the procedures explained in 4.2.1.4. If the client cannot authenticate the
cloud server the connection is dropped.
4. The client then sends its certificate and associated certificate chain to the server to be
authenticated.
5. During these communications, information to establish an encrypted AES channel
has been exchanged and all future communications are through this encrypted AES
channel.

49

6

6.1

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions
The framework established by this research has been able to accomplish the goals stated

in section 3.2.

With this framework, authenticated and secure communications can be

established between a cloud-based PACS server and PACS clients, including mobile clients.
The PKI established is flexible enough to be fit for use in a variety of different scenarios and
with different scales of implementations. By using mutually authenticated TLS and an enterprise
style PKI, the framework uses well established and common methods to create a system which
can authorize, authenticate and secure communications between a PACS client and cloud-base
server. The framework has been created to be used with a cloud-based PACS server and only
uses functionality which is common on most cloud IaaS implementations which means it can be
used generically to create a cloud-based medical image storage and management system with
secure communications.

6.2

Validation
This framework was validated by creating a functioning prototype. The framework

provided the basis to produce an operational implementation of a cloud-based PACS server with
mobile PACS clients. Many implementation options and concerns are expressed by the
framework to guide the creator to make the best decisions for the situation at hand. The
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prototype used the Windows Azure cloud services for the cloud IaaS and Windows 7 machines
for the PACS clients. For the PKI servers, Windows Server 2008 R2 machines with Active
Directory Certificate Services were used. With this prototype, certificates were created and
distributed, and the client and cloud server were able to establish an authenticated and encrypted
channel to communicate.

6.3

Future Work
There are many other considerations which need to be taken into account when having a

cloud based PACS server. Research has begun, but needs to be further extended, to secure
medical data at rest on cloud systems. With this framework, the communications are secure but
the data is being stored on a third-party’s server unencrypted. There needs to be a means where
that data is protected from intruders and even the administrators of the cloud service. If a
practical secure means can be established for data at rest, this would resolve the primary
concerns specific to putting a PACS server on a public cloud-based system.
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APPENDIX A: PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE SETUP

The prototype for this research used Windows 2008 R2 with Active Directory Certificate
Services to create the CAs for the PKI. The prototype used the basic functionality of Active
Directory Certificate Services to create a root CA and an issuing CA using the standalone CA
functionality. Active Directory Certificate Services offers a much richer set of functionality
which could be very useful especially if the primary network uses Active Directory for user and
machine management. These services include automated issuing and distribution of certificates
and active connections between CAs. The basic instructions for how to setup the PKI used for
this prototype is as follows.

Setup the Root CA.
1. Install Windows 2008 R2.
2. In the Server Manager, enable the Active Directory Certificate Service role.
a. Enable the Certification Authority service.
b. Select that this will be a standalone root CA.
c. Create a new private RSA 2048 bit key with a 10 year validity period.

Setup the Issuing CA.
1. Install Windows 2008 R2.
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2. Install Root CA certificate on Issuing CA.
a. On the Root CA, go to the Certificate Services interface, right click on the
server name and go to Properties.
b. In the General tab, click View Certificate.
c. Go to the Details tab and click on Copy to File…
d. Save as a DER encoded binary X.509 file.
e. Send file to the Issuing CA.
f. On the Issuing CA, double click on the certificate and install the certificate to
the Trusted Root Certificate Authorities store.
3. In the Server Manager, enable the Active Directory Certificate Service role.
a. Enable the Certification Authority, Certification Authority Web Roll, and
Online Responder services.

This will also enable IIS and several other

services.
b. Select that this will be a standalone subordinate CA.
c. Create a new private RSA 2048 bit key with a 10 year validity period.
d. Save a certificate request to manually send to the parent CA.
4. Get certificate signed by Root CA.
a. Send request file to Root CA.
b. Submit request to Root CA.
i. In Server Manager  Roles  Active Directory Certification
Services, right click on the server name  All Tasks  Submit new
request…
ii. Select the request file and open.
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c. In Pending Requests, right click on the request and select Issue.
d. Verify that it was issued by looking in Issued Certificates.
5. Distribute certificate to Issuing CA.
a. In Issued Certificates, double click to open the certificate.
b. Under the Details tab, click Copy to File…
c. Save as DER encoded binary X.509 file.
d. Send file to Issuing CA.
e. Install certificate by going into the Certificate Services interface, right click on
the server name  All Actions  Install CA Certificate…  select  open.

Setup CRL on Root and Issuing CAs.
1. Check CA setup for CRL.
a. In the Certificate Services interface, right click on the server name 
Properties  Extensions Tab.

Select the CRL Distribution Point (CDP)

extension.
2. Set overlap for CRL.
a. In the command line put in the following commands.
certutil -setreg ca\CRLOverlapUnits 24
certutil -setreg ca\CRLOverlapPeriod hours
certutil -setreg ca\CRLOverlapUnits 12
certutil -setreg ca\CRLOverlapPeriod hours
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3. Check issuing intervals.
a. In the Certificate Services interface under the server name, right click on
Revoked Certificates and go to Properties.
b. Set the CRL publication interval as desired.
With these procedures done, the PKI is setup to issue certificates to the endpoints that
send requests to the Issuing CA. The Root CA can be taken off the network or turned off at this
point. Requests made to get certificates signed will go to the Issuing CA and will be distributed
back to the endpoint as will be explained in Appendix B.
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APPENDIX B: CREATING AND ISSUING CERTIFICATES

Once the procedures in Appendix A are complete, the PKI is setup to create certificates
for the clients and cloud server. The procedures here will explain how to issue certificates to
Windows 7 PACS clients, and the Windows Azure cloud services.

Client Certificate - Request, Issue and Distribute
1. Install Root CA and Issuing CA certificates on PACS client.
a. Save the Root CA and Issuing CA certificate to file as described in Appendix
A, section 2.c and send those certificates to the PACS client.
b. On the PACS client, double click on each certificate. Install the Root CA
certificates into the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store. Install the
Issuing CA certificates into the Intermediate Certification Authorities store. If
Policy CAs are used, install those certificates like the Issuing CA certificate.
2. Create a certificate for PACS client.
a. On the Windows 7 PACS client, open the certificate manager by typing
certmgr.msc into the Start menu search bar and open the program.
b. Click on Personal.

Right click on Certificates and select All Tasks 

Advanced Operations  Create Custom Request…
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c. Select Proceed without enrollment policy.
Note: If this machine and the CAs are connected to an Active Directory
domain, certificate templates can be used here to simplify the rest of the
request and distribution processes.
d. For Custom request, use the defaults.
e. For Certificate information, click on the arrow next to Details and click on
Properties.
f. In the General tab, put in a friendly name and description. They can be
anything.
g. In the Subject tab, the minimum is to put in a Subject name of type Common
name. Put the value that will identity the owner of the certificate. Other data
can also be specified as desired. This data can be used to identify and log who
accessed the server.
h. In the Extensions tab under Key usage, add Data encipherment and Key
encipherment.
i. In the Extensions tab under Extended Key Usage, add Server Authentication
and Client Authentication.
j. In the Private Key tab, look over the settings. The defaults are sufficient but
can be changed if desired.
k. Click OK to close the Certificate Properties.
l. Specify where to save the file.
3. Request certificate to be signed by Issuing CA.
a. In a web browser, go to http://[domain or IP address of Issuing CA]/certsrv/
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b. Click on Request a certificate.
c. Click on Advanced certificate request.
d. Open the request saved to file and copy and paste the contents into the
textbox.
e. Submit the request.
4. Sign certificate on Issuing CA.
a. On the Issuing CA in the Certificate Services interface, go to the Pending
Requests.
b. Right click on the requested certificate  All Tasks  Issue
c. Verify certificate was issued correctly in the Issued Certificates section.
5. Distribute certificate to PACS client.
a. On the PACS client in the same web browser, go to http://[domain or IP
address of Issuing CA]/certsrv/ and click on “View the status of a pending
certificate request”.
b. Click on the Saved-Request Certificate.
c. Click on Download certificate.
Note: Download certificate chain downloads a .p7b file which will not work
on a Windows 7 machine directly. If it did, it would install the entire chain.
For these instructions, the Root CA and Issuing CA certificates have already
been installed.
d. Double click on the downloaded certificate.
e. Install the certificate to the Personal store.
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Cloud Server Certificate - Request, Issue and Distribute
This process is almost identical to the process for client certificates. Windows Azure
does not have the ability to easily create a certificate request for itself. Instead, use the Issuing
CA or a trusted client to create the request for the cloud server. Follow all the steps described for
the client certificate above with two exceptions. (1) Make the Common name of the Subject the
cloud server domain (e.g. pacsserver.com) in the Subject tab, Subject name area. (2) Make the
private key exportable under the Private Key tab, Key options area. When the process described
above is completed, do the following steps to distribute it to the Windows Azure cloud server.
1. Install the Root CA and Issuing CA certificates on the Windows Azure hosted
service.
a. Use the same certificates that were installed onto the PACS client.
b. In a web browser, go to the Windows Azure portal  “Hosted Services,
Storage Accounts & CDN”  Hosted Services.
c. Under the hosted service, click on Certificates  Add Certificate.
d. Browse for the Root CA and Issuing CA certificates and click open. Then
click install.
Note: Currently the Windows Azure portal will only display .pfx files. Go to
the right folder and type in the .cer file name and click open. You will need to
put in a password (any characters) to install.
2. Install the cloud server’s certificate.
a. Save the cloud server certificate as a file.
i. On the machine that requested and was issued the cloud server
certificate, go to the certificate manager (certmgr.msc).
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ii. In Personal  Certificates, open the cloud server certificate.
iii. In the Details tab, click on Copy to File…
iv. Choose to export the private key.
v. Use the Personal Information Exchange format and check Delete the
private key if the export is successful.
vi. Create a password for the certificate.
vii. Save certificate to file.
b. Install certificate onto cloud server.
i. In the Windows Azure portal under the hosted service click on
Certificates  Add Certificate.
ii. Select the certificate file, put in the password and install.
At this point, certificates have been issued to the client and the cloud server. This means
that these devices have been authorized to use the system. The system now needs to be setup to
use these certificates to authenticate the endpoints when they try to make a connection which
will be explained in Appendix C.
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APPENDIX C: PROGRAMMING TLS IN .NET

To create an authenticated and secured TLS connection, both the server and the client
need to be programmed to validate the certificates that are exchanged. In the .NET framework,
the server and client endpoints are programmed very similarly. This appendix will show how to
program both the client and the serer to mutually authenticate and create an encrypted channel.
It is assumed that the PKI is setup and certificates have been distributed to the Windows Azure
cloud server and the Windows 7 client as described in Appendix A and Appendix B.

TLS on Cloud Server
This appendix is based on the fact that a Windows Azure PACS server project is being
used such as the MIMIC project, and that Visual Studio 2010 with the Azure tools will be used
as the development environment. There are two primary places that need to be modified to make
the program use a TLS authenticated and encrypted channel instead of the basic DICOM
channel. (1) The role’s configurations need to be setup to use the certificates installed on the
cloud server. (2) The code for establishing a connection to a client needs to be modified to use
the TLS functionality provided by the .NET framework.
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Configuring the Role Configuration
To be able to develop and have the deployed cloud service work, the Root CA, Issuing
CA and cloud server certificates need to be installed on the cloud server and on the development
machine. Configure the role’s setting as follows to allow the deployed cloud service to access
those certificates.
1. In the Role configurations, go to Certificates.
2. Click Add Certificate
3. For the Root CA, Issuing CA and cloud server certificates do the following.
a. Put the name of the certificate which should be the Subject’s Common name.
b. Put the Store Location as CurrentUser.
c. For the Root CA certificate, put the Store Name as Root. For the Issuing CA and
cloud server certificate, put the Store Name as My.
d. Put in the thumbprint of the certificate which can be obtained by going to the
certificate manager, opening the certificate and looking under the Details tab.

TLS Authenticated and Encrypted Channel
The server needs to be programmed to create an authenticated and encrypted channel.
This code needs to be where the server first connects to the client.

In this case, the

System.Net.Sockets.TcpClient will be used and modified to create the TLS channel. The code
will be explained in code segments to explain what is required.
First, the SslStream needs to be setup to authenticate and create an encrypted TLS
connection.
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sslStream = new SslStream(
s.GetStream(), // s is the TcpClient object
false,
new RemoteCertificateValidationCallback(CertificateValidationCallback));
X509Certificate cert = getServerCert();
sslStream.AuthenticateAsServer(
cert,
true,
SslProtocols.Tls,
true);

The SslStream constructor takes in three arguments: TcpClient object, if the inner stream
should be left open and a RemoteCertificateValidationCallback. The TcpClient object is the
object that was opened to listen for a request from a client. The inner stream does not need to be
left open after the SslStream has been closed. The RemoteCertificateValidationCallback will
validate remote certificates from the clients and will be discussed later.
The getServerCert function has been defined to retrieve the cloud server certificate from
the certificate store to be used to authenticate to the client.
SslStream.AuthenticateAsServer function takes in 4 arguments: the server certificate to
use, if the client certificate is required, the SSL protocol to use, and if the CRL should be
checked. After this is performed, the sslStream object should be used as the network stream to
communicate with the client. This is the generic code required to create a TLS connection with a
client on the server-site.
For this framework, the RemoteCertificateValidationCallback needs to be specified to
check that the remote certificate chain includes the correct root CA and possibly identify what
Policy or Issuing CA is in the certificate chain. The RemoteCertificateValidationCallback for
this prototype is as follows.
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private static bool CertificateValidationCallback(
object sender,
X509Certificate cert,
X509Chain chain,
SslPolicyErrors sslPolicyErrors)
{
if (sslPolicyErrors != SslPolicyErrors.None)
{
return false;
}
foreach (X509ChainElement chainElement in chain.ChainElements)
{
// authorizingCASubject & authorizingCAThumbprint are variables
// which can contain information about the Root, Policy or Issuing CA
// to be checked.
if (chainElement.Certificate.Subject == authorizingCASubject &&
chainElement.Certificate.Thumbprint == authorizingCAThumbprint){
return true;
}
}
}

return false;

This function first checks if there were an SslPolicyError from the standard .NET
functionality which includes a check that the certificate has been signed by a CA trusted by the
system, checking the expiration date and checking the CRL. Next, it needs to be verified that the
certificate was signed specifically by the mutually trusted Root CA. This is done by looping
through the certificates in the certificate chain and finding the Root CA’s certificate. If this is
found, it returns true indicating that the certificate is valid. If a Policy CA or Issuing CA’s
certificate needs to be checked, it can be done in that loop. A system log can also be created in
this function to save certificate information about the client accessing the server.
With these steps performed, the cloud server has verified that the client is authorized to
access the system.
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TLS on Client
The PACS client was implemented using a Windows 7 machine with the correct
certificates installed as specified in Appendix B. The prototype used the MUCK project as the
base PACS client and modified how this client established its network connection to create the
TLS authenticated and encrypted channel. The code for the client is very similar to the serverside code.

SslStream sslStream = new SslStream(
net, // net is the TcpClient object
false,
new RemoteCertificateValidationCallback(CertificateValidationCallback),
new LocalCertificateSelectionCallback(getClientCert));
X509CertificateCollection certs = getClientCerts();
sslStream.AuthenticateAsClient(
serverSubject,
certs,
SslProtocols.Tls,
true);

The SslStream constructor takes in four arguments: the TcpClient object, if the stream
should

be

left

open,

the

RemoteCertificateValidationCallback

and

the

LocalCertificateSelectionCallback. The TcpClient is the object used to create the request to the
server.

The stream does not need to be left open after the SslStream is closed.

The

RemoteCertificateValidationCallback is used to validate the server certificate and is the same as
is explained for the cloud server. The LocalCertificateSelectionCallback is used to choose a
specific certificate from the collection passed into the SslStream.AuthenticateAsClient function.
This allows the client to choose a client certificate based on the certificate given by the server.
Although this functionality is not necessary for this specific implementation it is required by the
.NET functionality.
69

The getClientCerts function is used to get a collection of certificates that can be used to
authenticate. As specified before, the LocalCertificateSelectionCallback will choose the specific
certificate out of that collection to use.
SslStream.AuthenticateAsClient function takes four arguments: the expected server
subject, a collection of client certificate, the SSL protocol to use, and if the CRL should be
checked. The expected server subject is what is what the client expects the server certificate’s
subject common name to contain. If the server certificate has a different subject, then the
server’s certificate will be seen as invalid and the connection will be dropped.
With this in place, the sslStream object will be used as the network stream for the
remainder of the communication. This will provide an authenticated and encrypted channel for
communication.
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